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Commentary on Birch on Precautionary Principle
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Abstract: The precautionary principle gives the animal the benefit of the doubt when its sentient
status is not known. This is necessary for advanced invertebrates such as cephalopods because
research and evidence concerning the criteria for sentience are scattered and often insufficient to
give us the background for the decision.

Jennifer Mather, Professor of Psychology at the University
of Lethbridge, does research on cephalopod behavior,
particularly that of octopuses. She is co-editor of the
upcoming book “Invertebrate Welfare” in the Springer
series on animal welfare. directory.uleth.ca/users/mather

Using a Precautionary Principle to judge animal sentience for welfare, Birch (2017) argues that we
should 'set the bar low' and not wait for evidence for every less-studied species related in an
Order. For the cephalopod molluscs, for whom there is evidence of sentience (Mather, 2008), the
lack of information about their physiology and behavior means that we should indeed set the bar
low, but for the whole group. As Birch and others have pointed out, we can never know for sure
whether a species or an individual feels pain, or feels at all, because these are private experiences.
Moreover, cephalopods and vertebrates are not similar anatomically, physiologically or
behaviorally. Even though they have as many neurons as most small mammals and birds,
cephalopods have 3/5 of these neurons in the eight arms, not in the central brain. Arm actions
seem to be poorly represented in the brain, and Grasso (2014) suggests that the arm system may
collectively make up a 'second brain.' Where would sentience reside, then? The cephalopods have
a three-part behavioral system, composed of brain processing, the chromatophore-based skin
display system, and the arms using localized feedback and integration (see Mather & Dickel, 2017,
for an attempt to diagram this circuitry). While we have come far from Wells's (1978) allegation
that the brain doesn't monitor the arm system, our evidence as to how these systems interact
and are monitored is still fragmentary (Mather & Dickel, 2017).
Given our lack of knowledge of cephalopods, we should be careful to include or exclude
these animals from ethical consideration based on the results of the few situations tested on one
or two species so far. Birch suggests self-delivery of anesthetics, motivational tradeoffs, and
conditioned place avoidance. A better set of criteria might be the more extensive one suggested
by Smith et al. (2013) and evaluated for cephalopods by Andrews et al. (2013). These include
presence of nociceptive receptors, possession of 'higher' integrative brain centers, connection of
the nociceptive pathways to these centers, opioid receptors in the central nervous system,
analgesics that modify responses to stimuli that would be painful to humans, learned association
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of presumably painful events to non-painful ones, and (most importantly) behavior indicating
central actions based on the peripheral input. One might evaluate a particular animal based on
the cumulative evidence from these many anatomical, physiological and behavioral variables, but
no cephalopod has yet been tested for more than a few of them.
Adamo (2017) points out that clumping all animals of the same family together for the
evaluation of sentience might be problematic. She gives the example of the active Octopus
vulgaris and the far less reactive deep-sea Bathypolypus arcticus. Yet we must also be careful not
to mistake different behavioral responses to similar stimuli for possession of different
physiological capacities. There are only two well-controlled studies of responses to arm removal
in the cephalopods: those of Crook, Lewis, Hanlon, and Walters (2011) on Loligo squid and of
Alupay, Hadjisolomou, and Crook (2014) on Abdopus octopuses. Both studies found strong
behavioral responses: short- and long-term local responses and general avoidance responses. The
squid, however, did not show the wound-tending behavior that suggests central monitoring of
the peripheral stimuli (criterion 6 of Smith, 2013) whereas the octopuses did. Given the
anatomical and behavioral similarities between the octopuses and the squid, it would be difficult
to conclude that one animal group 'passed' a test for sentience and the other 'failed' on the basis
of two studies. Until we have much more evidence of control and monitoring of the cephalopod
nervous system and behavior, the adoption of Birch's Precautionary Principle for the treatment
of these animals would be wise indeed.
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ANIMAL CONSCIOUSNESS
On November 17-18, 2017, the NYU Center for Mind, Brain and
Consciousness, the NYU Center for Bioethics, and NYU Animal Studies will
host a conference on Animal Consciousness.
This conference will bring together philosophers and scientists to discuss
questions such as: Are invertebrates conscious? Do fish feel pain? Are nonhuman mammals self-conscious? How did consciousness evolve? How does
research on animal consciousness affect the ethical treatment of animals? What
is the impact of issues about animal consciousness on theories of consciousness
and vice versa? What are the best methods for assessing consciousness in nonhuman animals?

Speakers and panelists include:
Colin Allen (University of Pittsburgh, Department of History & Philosophy of
Science), Andrew Barron (Macquarie, Cognitive Neuroethology),
Victoria Braithwaite (Penn State, Biology), Peter Carruthers (Maryland,
Philosophy), Marian Dawkins (Oxford, Zoology), Dan Dennett (Tufts,
Philosophy), David Edelman (San Diego, Neuroscience),
Todd Feinberg (Mt. Sinai, Neurology), Peter Godfey-Smith (Sydney,
Philosophy), Lori Gruen (Wesleyan, Philosophy), Brian Hare (Duke, Evolutionary
Anthropology), Stevan Harnad (Montreal, Cognitive Science), Eva Jablonka (Tel
Aviv, Cohn Institute), Björn Merker (Neuroscience), Diana Reiss (Hunter,
Psychology), Peter Singer (Princeton, Philosophy), Michael Tye (Texas, Philosophy)

Organizers: Ned Block, David Chalmers, Dale Jamieson, S. Matthew Liao.
The conference will run from 9am on Friday November 17 to 6pm on Saturday November 18 at the NYU Cantor Film Center (36 E
8th St).
Friday sessions will include “Invertebrates and the evolution of consciousness”, “Do fish feel pain?”, and “Animal consciousness
and ethics”.
Saturday sessions will include “Animal self-consciousness”, “Animal consciousness and theories of consciousness”, and a panel
discussion.
A detailed schedule will be circulated closer to the conference date.
Registration is free but required.

Register here.
See also the conference website.

